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Koons Ford of Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Koons Ford of Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach, Maryland's highest court
was asked to use the tools of statutory interpretation to decide which of two
federal acts, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act (MMWA), is to prevail when the two acts come into direct
conflict.' Numerous state and federal courts throughout the United States that
have been asked this question have come to opposite conclusions, resulting
in a sharp jurisdictional split.2 The issue of which act predominates is
particularly difficult because there are strong public policy arguments in
support of each federal act: wanting to preserve the terms of bargained-for
contracts that include arbitration agreements for the FAA, and wanting to
protect the rights of less informed buyers against more educated sellers for
the MMWA. 3 With its decision in Koons Ford, Maryland's highest court
joined the minority of jurisdictions that have held that the MMWA trumps
the FAA.4
* Koons Ford of Bait., Inc. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722 (Md. 2007).
See id. at 723-24.
2 See id. at 732-34. The majority of jurisdictions including the Fifth Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit; federal district courts in Alabama, Arizona, and Michigan; and the
highest state courts in Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas have held that the FAA
should predominate. See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir.
2002); Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Patriot Mfg. v.
Dixon, 399 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Ala. 2005); Dombrowski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 318
F. Supp. 2d 850 (D. Ariz. 2004); Pack v. Damon Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 545 (E.D. Mich.
2004); Patriot Mfg. v. Jackson, 929 So. 2d 997 (Ala. 2005); Borowiec v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 209 Ill. 2d 376 (Ill. 2004); Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 603 (Mich.
2004); In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. 2001). District courts
in Ohio and Virginia have held that the MMWA should predominate. See Rickard v.
Teynor's Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Browne v. Kline Tysons
Imps., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Va. 2002); Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes,
Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958 (W.D. Va. 2000).
3 See Daniel G. Lloyd, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act v. the Federal Arbitration
Act: The Quintessential Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2003).
4 See Koons Ford ofBalt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 723-24.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 20, 2001, William Lobach purchased a 2001 Ford Escort
from the Koons Ford dealership in Baltimore, Maryland. 5 William's father,
Raymond Lobach, co-signed for the car.6 Both William and Raymond signed
each side of a double-sided buyer's order. 7 The reverse side of the buyer's
order included a binding arbitration provision.8 Specifically, this provision
stated that all claims relating to the car would be resolved through binding
arbitration and that the agreement would be governed by the FAA.9
On April 20, 2005, Raymond Lobach filed a complaint against Koons
Ford in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 10 Lobach's complaint
contained six counts against Koons Ford, including a MMWA claim,"I and
alleged that Koons Ford failed to disclose defects and prior damage to the
car.12 On June 3, 2005, Koons Ford filed a petition with the circuit court to
stay the case so that claims could be arbitrated pursuant to the buyer's
order.13 The circuit court denied this petition on August 26, 2005.14 Koons
Ford filed an amended petition requesting the same relief as the original
petition on September 26, 2005.15 The circuit court granted Koons Ford's
amended petition on all counts except for the MMWA claim on March 10,
2006.16
5 Id. at 724.
6 Id.
71d.
8 Id.
9Id.
10 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 724.
11 Id. at 724-25. Lobach alleged that Koons Ford violated the MMWA by selling the
car in violation of implied and express warranties of merchantability and fitness. Facts
used to support this claim included: (1) both a sales representative and a finance
representative stated that the car did not have any prior damage; (2) the Used Vehicle
Disclosure Form stated that the car had never been used commercially; (3) a diagnostic
evaluation of the car revealed that it had prior accident damage; (4) a service technician
stated that the odometer had been rolled back and that the car had mechanical problems;
and (5) the car had prior commercial use as a lease and rental vehicle. Id. at 724 n.2.
12Id.
13 Id. at 725.
14 Id.
15 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 725.
16 Id. In granting this amended petition, the circuit court necessarily concluded that
binding arbitration pursuant to the signed buyer's order was appropriate for the state law
statutory, contractual, and fraud claims. See id
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On April 10, 2006, Koons Ford filed an appeal with the Court of Special
Appeals, the state of Maryland's intermediate appellate court.17 While this
appeal was still pending, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the highest court in
the state, accepted the Koons Ford case by issuing a writ of certiorari on its
own motion on September 13, 2006.18 Though Koons Ford presented two
questions on appeal and Lobach presented six questions on appeal, the
primary issue before the Maryland Court of Appeals was whether MMWA
claims should be subject to binding arbitration in light of a contractual
agreement between the parties.19
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that claimants cannot be forced to
resolve their MMWA claims through binding arbitration. 20 In so holding, this
court concluded that "Congress expressed an intent to preclude binding
arbitration when it enacted the MMWA."2 1 Five judges signed the majority
opinion and two judges dissented.22
A. The FAA and the MMWA
In 1925, the FAA23 was enacted with the purpose of "mak[ing] valid and
enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes
arising out of contracts [and other listed categories of transactions]. " 24
Specifically, the FAA states that written arbitration provisions included in
certain types of transactions, including commercial contracts, "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract., 25
17 Id.
18 Id. at 725-26.
19 See id. at 725 n.5.
20 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 723.
21 Id. at 723-24.
22 Id. at 722. The brief, straightforward dissent written by Judge Harrell and joined
by Judge Raker cites a large number of cases that have held that the FAA should
predominate and asserts that the majority decision is "completely out-of-step with both
Congress' and the U.S. Supreme Court's views regarding arbitration not being inherently
hostile to consumers' interests." Id. at 738 (Harrel, J., dissenting).
23 See 9 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq. (2000).
24 United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
25 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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Between the time of its enactment and the 1980s, the FAA was not
generally applied to statutory claims.26 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court
changed its public policy to favor compelled arbitration, stating that "we
[must] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate ... at least absent a
countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute."27 This strong
public policy in favor of arbitration has further evolved to the point that
"even claims arising under a statute designed to further important social
policies may be arbitrated 'so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate his statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.' 28
Fifty years later, in 1975, Congress enacted the MMWA 29 with a stated
statutory purpose of "provid[ing] minimum disclosure standards for written
consumer product warranties;. . . defin[ing] minimum Federal content
standards for such warranties;... amend[ing] the Federal Trade Commission
Act in order to improve its consumer protection activities; and for other
purposes." 30 To promote these purposes, the MMWA provides a private right
of action to consumers who are "damaged by the failure of a supplier,
warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this
title, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract. '31
The MMWA discusses "informal dispute settlement procedures" as a
means of encouraging settlement,32 but Congress never explicitly defined the
term "informal dispute settlement procedures. '33 Rather, Congress delegated
power to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to "devise minimum
requirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure incorporated into
the written warranty. '34 In the regulations it drafted, the FTC chose the term
"Mechanism" to describe the "informal dispute settlement procedure[s]"
discussed in the MMWA, 35 and stated that "[d]ecisions of the Mechanism
shall not be legally binding on any person. '36
26 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 729.
27 Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
2 8 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 730 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et. seq. (2000).
30 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
31 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2000).
32 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(a) (2000).
33 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 731.
34 Id.
35 16 C.F.R. § 703.1(e) (2007).
36 16 C.F.R. § 703.50) (2007).
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B. Statutory Interpretation
In Koons Ford, the Maryland Court of Appeals examined two different
statutory interpretation tests that have previously been used by other
jurisdictions to decide the issue of whether the FAA or the MMWA should
predominate: the McMahon test and the Chevron test.37 The test used to
determine whether a statute's purpose conflicts with the strong federal public
policy favoring arbitration is found in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon.38 Under the McMahon test, "[t]he burden is on the party opposing
arbitration ... to show that Congress intended to preclude [application of the
FAA by demonstrating an intent discernable] ... from [the statute's] text or
legislative history,.., or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and
the statute's underlying purposes."39
Because Congress did not define the term "informal dispute settlement
procedure" within the MMWA, but rather delegated the authority to define
that term to the FTC, the test found in Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. governing regulations drafted by
administrative agencies has also been applied by courts deciding this issue.
40
The Chevron test is a two-pronged test which first asks "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,"41 and if it is determined
that Congress has not so spoken, then asks "whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." 42
After discussing how other jurisdictions have resolved the issue,43 the
Koons Ford court started its analysis by looking to the plain language of the
text of the MMWA in an attempt to determine congressional intent.44 This
court concluded that the plain language of the MMWA indicates a clear
congressional intent to preclude the enforcement of binding arbitration
37 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 732-34.
38 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
39 Id.
40 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
41 Id. at 842.
4 2 Id. at 843.
43 Koons Ford of Bait., Inc., 919 A.2d at 733-36. This court specifically discussed
the Fifth Circuit decision in Walton, 298 F.3d at 470; the Eleventh Circuit decision in
Davis, 305 F.3d at 1268; the Northern District of Ohio decision in Rickard, 279 F. Supp.
2d at 910; and the Eastern District of Virginia decision in Browne, 190 F. Supp. 2d at
827. Id.
44Id. at 735.
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clauses.45 Even though Congress did not specifically discuss binding
arbitration in the MMWA, this court determined that the lack of mention
does not mean that Congress failed to speak to the issue, because binding
arbitration was not as common and the FAA was not as widely applicable in
1975 when the MMWA was passed as it is today. 46
The Koons Ford court next looked to the legislative history of the
MMWA, reasoning that both the House Report47 and the Senate Conference
Committee Report48 reveal "the congressional intent to prevent consumers
from being forced into binding arbitration because such a resolution would
constitute a substitute for litigation." 49 Further, because the MMWA was
enacted with a pro-consumer purpose and was enacted before the expansion
of the FAA to statutory claims, this court concluded that the House Report
and the Senate Conference Committee Report comprise clear evidence of a
congressional intent to protect consumers from being forced to resolve their
claims through binding arbitration. 50 This court concluded by asserting that
to interpret the legislative history of the MMWA to permit binding
arbitration would be inconsistent with common sense, and that if Congress
intended the alternate interpretation, it could have said so explicitly.51
After examining the plain language and the legislative history of the
MMWA, the Maryland Court of Appeals applied the Chevron test.52 Having
previously concluded that the first prong of Chevron was met,53 this court
then analyzed whether the FTC's interpretation was based on a permissible
construction of the MMWA. 54 This court held that the second prong of
Chevron was met "for all of the reasons set forth supra, describing why this
Court believes that Congress evinced such an intent."55 Furthermore, this
court stated that the FTC clarification that binding arbitration is not an
"informal dispute settlement procedure" was based on the plain language of
the MMWA in 1999 when it stated "[a]lthough several industry
representatives at that time [1975] had recommended that the Rule allow
45 Id.
4 6 1d. at 735 n.10.
47 H.R. REP. No. 93-1107 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702.
48 S. CONF. REP. No. 93-1408 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7755.
49 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 736.
5 0 d.
5 1 Id. at 737.
52 Id.
53 See id. at 735.
54 Id. at 737.
55 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 737.
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warrantors to require consumers to submit to binding arbitration, the [FTC]
rejected that view as being contrary to the congressional intent. ' 56
Although courts in other jurisdictions that have decided this issue have
implicated the McMahon test, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the
McMahon test does not apply because neither McMahon nor the cases that
expanded the application of the FAA had been decided when the MMWA
was enacted in 1975.57 By dismissing the McMahon test as inapplicable, this
court distinguished the majority of cases from other jurisdictions that have
held that the FAA prevails over the MMWA. 58
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S RULING
The Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Koons Ford of Baltimore,
Inc. v. Lobach served to further deepen the jurisdictional split between state
and federal courts that have decided the issue of whether MMWA claims can
be forced into binding arbitration. 59 Until the United States Supreme Court
addresses this issue, the existing circuit split is likely to become even more
profound as more and more courts throughout the country are faced with this
difficult statutory interpretation question.60 In addition to resolving the circuit
split, the Supreme Court should choose to accept this issue when it first gets
the opportunity to do so because of its broader policy implications of whether
the liberal public policy of favoring arbitration agreements can ever be
overcome by countervailing concerns.61
Shannon Karla
56 Id. at 737 n.1 1 (quoting 64 Fed. Reg. 19700, 19708 (Apr. 22, 1999)).
57 Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., 919 A.2d at 735 n.10.
58 Id. at 735.
59 See Justin Kelly, Court Rules No Binding Arbitration Under Magnuson-Moss,
ADRWorld.com, Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.adrworld.com.
60 See Lloyd, supra note 3, at 3.
61 See id. at 34-35.
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